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Abstract 
The strong need is therefore induced for an environmental cost-sharing methodology is an importance of the topic of 
reverse logistics has increased gradually over the past few years. Because of network effects, most of the 
environmental costs of reverse logistics cannot be considered as directly attributable; the environmental cost-sharing 
among the reverse logistics in Household Appliances enterprises is one of the toughest problems. In this paper, 
environmental cost-sharing method for the reverse logistics of discarded appliances is put forward based on the 
Shapley-valve. Finally, an example is given to show the feasibility and availability of the developed method. 
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1. Introduction 
 Increasing world population and standards of living have magnified resource consumption and the 
disposal rate. In a typical day, humans add 15 million tons of carbon to the atmosphere, destroy 115 
square miles of tropical rainforest, create 72 square miles of desert, eliminate between 40 and 100 species, 
erode 71 million tons of topsoil, add 2700 tons of CFCs (Chlorofluorocarbons) to the environment and 
increase population by 263,000. As head of Oberlin College’s Environmental Science department David 
W. Orr says, “We can no longer assume that nature will be either bountiful or stable or that the earth will 
remain hospitable to civilization as we know it” [1]. 
Growing concerns about climate changes, local and regional impacts of air, ground and water pollution 
from industrial activities have significantly expanded the interaction between environmental management 
and operations, leading to the area termed as “reverse logistics” (Corbett and Kleindrofer, 2001b)[2]. On 
the other hand, processed waste materials and end-of-life goods to be substituted for raw resources will 
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save money in terms of both purchasing fewer raw materials and producing fewer disposals. There has 
been a significant growing interest in the subject of reverse logistics (Krikke, 1999; Sarkis, 2001; 
Fleischmann, 2001) [3-4].  
There are economical and political justifications that highlight the necessity of investment in this area 
of research. Public pressure on reducing the environmental impacts of industrial operations has resulted in 
setting nonflexible standards and penalties for environmentally intensive industrial operations (Corbett 
and Kleindrofer, 2001a) [5].  
 The environmental costs of reverse logistics are mostly indirect cost, assisting the whole values chain 
rather than part of it. The environmental cost is implied in the various costs of firms and cannot be 
separated from them. This means that the drivers of these environmental costs cannot be clearly identified 
and defined, which arose the problem of environmental costs accounting and increased the operation risks 
of firms. This is especially the case when no responsible role can be assigned due to the vague definition 
of who should be held accountable for the environmental protection. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
the attribution of environmental costs to the accountable roles in the value chain is key to the 
development of the low-carbon economy and the lack of this kind of mechanism will endanger the 
development of reverse logistics also. 
  A most fully solution concept of cooperative game application by many scholars to solve the problem 
of cost sharing in practice at present. The Shapley value was introduced by Shapley [1953] as a method 
for each player is the expected marginal contribution of that player. Put differently, it measures how the 
value of a coalition changes when a particular player participates in it, and then averages this value across 
all possible coalitions that could form in the game. The Shapley value of the game is a unique payoff 
vector, assigning to each player an expected marginal contribution. It has the advantage of being a 
reasonably easy way to calculate an individual's contribution to a group effort. The sum of the individual 
values exactly equals the value of the game itself.  
The Shapley value has been used in models of taxation, allocating joint costs, and the study of voting 
power and other political mechanisms. In political contexts, the Shapley value has been used as an 
objective measure of the political power of individuals and political parties or coalitions. Nevertheless 
because of network effects, most of the environmental costs cannot be considered as directly attributable. 
A strong need is therefore induced for environmental cost sharing methodologies. It is now well admitted 
that most of the classical accounting methods fail to satisfy some natural requirements. With the 
introduction of cooperative game theory concepts, new methods have emerged and have for the first time 
casted light in the accounting community.  
The environmental costs have been addressed in a number of studies (see Litman 1999, for a 
comprehensive list of related studies). There are different opinions among researchers regarding the 
estimation of environmental transportation costs. Varieties of interpretation for emissions effects on 
environment and various methods to obtain these impacts are the major sources of controversy. 
 In this paper, we analyze the composition of reverse logistics for discarded appliances and link 
between them to show its application to the problem of environmental cost-sharing. The model of 
environmental cost-share of reverse logistics based on the Shapley value was built, and the basis of 
discussing the current situation of reverse logistics and summing up the results of domestic and overseas 
researches and practices in this area. We find that environmental cost-sharing of the reverse logistics 
follow the Shapley value solution. Finally, the last section gives an illustration of its performance on a 
simple example.  
2. The Environmental Costs Sharing of Reverse Logistics Based on the Shapley Value 
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 The environmental costs of reverse logistics include environmental impacts of transportation, impacts 
of energy, water pollution, air pollution, virgin material opportunity costs of producing from virgin 
materials, and disposal costs including tipping fees. Virgin material opportunity cost is the extra expense 
that a firm is willing to pay when it refuses to substitute the virgin material market by an acceptable 
recycled material. 
According to the cost drivers factors method of traditional to share the environmental costs of reverse 
logistics, and Shapley value in cooperative game full account of each player's marginal costs and benefits 
of making participation in the reverse logistics enterprises to bear the environmental cost is relatively fair 
for home appliances environmental costs of reverse logistics to provide a scientific and rational cost-
sharing program. 
 Let ^ `1, 2, ,N n  be a set of environmental cost is to be shared among N  farms of reverse logistics 
and denote )(Sc   the environmental cost attached to each subset or coalition S of firm.  
The environmental cost share problem can be formulated in a game theoretical way by selecting a 
vector 1( , , )na a a , called an allocation, that both satisfy [9]  
1) The cost recovery condition 
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2) The no-cross-subsidies condition that can be formulated as participation constraints: whatever the 
considered customer coalition, it will refuse to collaborate if it contributes more than it will pay while 
being served independently. Formulated with algebra, this imposes that
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Borrowing the concept from game theory, such an cost allocation is said to be in the core of the 
environmental cost allocation game. The core may be empty but in the following it will be assumed that a 
non-void core exists. 
Shapley (1953) has proved that there exists one and only one allocation ),,( 1 naaa   that satisfies the 
following axioms: 
Axiom1. Symmetry, for all permutations  of players such that ( ( ) ( )c S c S  , S ( )i ia a   
A symmetric problem has a symmetric solution. If one can find two firms that are identical from 
environmental cost perspective, it seems natural to award them identical environmental cost allocations. 
Axiom 2. Inessential players, If, for a player i , ^`( ) ( \ ( )c S c S i c i  for each coalition S to which he can 
belong, then ( )ia c i ). 
This means that if a particular customer has an incremental cost (to any coalition) that is always equal 
to his stand alone cost, then he can be considered as an inessential player who do not contribute to create 
any scale or scope economies. As a consequence, he will be awarded a contribution equal to his stand 
alone cost. 
Axiom 3. Additivity: Let [ , ( )]N c S  and [ , ( )]N c Sc be two cost games that relates to same set of 
customers, and )(cai  and )(cai c the associated allocations. Then i , ( ) ( ) ( )i i ia c c a c a cc c   . 
This axiom has a particular interest in practice. It means that an allocation computed at an aggregate 
level (when considering the firm has a whole) is fully compatible with the sum of all the allocations 
computed at a business unit level. To a certain extent, this additivity axiom is also underlying the cost 
allocation schemes derived from classical accountancy practices.   
The function ^`( ) ( )SiIC c S i c S   describes environmental cost of the reverse logistics facilities to the 
coalition S  when those facilities i S towards S . The only imputation that satisfies the axioms is called 
the Shapley value and can be written as: 
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Where S is the number of facility in coalitions S , and n  is the total number of facility in the reverse 
logistics, the environmental cost for the farm in reverse logistics can then be assigned by farm i its 
Shapley valueαi. Alternatively, when denoting S  the cardinality of the subset S : 
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                                                                 (3) 
 The monthly total cost of reverse logistics is (USD) $120, from which, $70 can be attributed to the 
firm as logistic operation cost, and environmental cost is thus $50. Then, this environmental cost can be 
attributed to the roles in the value chain using Shapley Value. Represented by 1, 2, 3 respectively, the set 
of this reserve logistics roles of the firm itself, the value-adding canters and disposal outlets can be 
presented as [1, 2,3]N  , and (1, 2,3)c =$50. Then, using the traditional way of attributing the 
environmental cost, cost allocation should be as (1)c = (2)c = (3)c =$10, (1, 3)c =$25, (2, 3)c =$30, 
(1, 2,3)c =$50. Because appliances firm and the value-adding cannot set up a joint supply chain alliance, 
so it does not exist (1, 2)c , and (1, 2) 0c  . We apply the Shapley value of cooperative game to build the 
allocation method of environmental cost among the reverse logistics. 
        According to the Shapley Value formula, 1 2 3( ) { ( ), ( ), ( )}c c c cI I I I means that the allocation 
method of environmental cost costs among the reverse logistics firms 1, 2, 3, where ( )i cI is assigns to each 
c a number for each i . is Is the coalition include a subset i .  
         Calculation of the Shapley Value is straight-forward, particularly, the environmental cost of reverse 
logistics firms 1 is 1( ) 12.5cI  . Similar calculations for players 2 and 3 environmental cost allocations 
2 ( ) 15cI  and 3 ( ) 22.5cI  , respectively. 
3. Conclusion 
       The allocation of environmental cost among the reverse logistics is one of the most difficult in 
accounting. The reverse logistics is of great importance to appliance manufactures and also a big challenge 
for Chinese logistic firms seeking the opportunities of low-carbon economy. However, there have been 
concerns on how to allocate the environmental cost among the reverse logistics chain. While most of 
current literatures are suggestion how to estimate the total environmental cost incurred, in this paper we 
have developed a model based on Shapley Value with which the environmental cost can be reasonably 
attributed among the partners in the reverse logistics of discarded appliances. The example is also given in 
this paper to show how this new method can reasonably and effectively distributed. 
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